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Does government spending affect income inequality? A meta-regression 
analysis  
Abstract 
In this paper findings of a meta-regression analysis are presented exploring the effects of 
government spending on income inequality, with a particular focus on low and middle income 
countries. We identify a total of 84 separate studies containing over 900 estimates of the effect of 
one or more measures of spending on one or more measures of income inequality. The results show 
some evidence of a moderate negative relationship between government spending and income 
inequality, which is strongest for social welfare and other social spending, and when using the Gini 
coefficient or the top income share as the measure of inequality. However, both the size and 
direction of the estimated relationship between government spending and income inequality is 
affected by a range of other factors, including the control variables and estimation method used. We 
also find evidence of publication bias, in that negative estimates of the relationship appear to be 
under-reported in the literature. 
 
Keywords: Income Inequality, Government Spending, Meta-regression 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of inequality has been a key issue in international development for several decades now. 
Since the 1970s, a large literature has emerged which documents the many adverse effects of 
inequality on socio-economic outcomes, including investment and economic growth, poverty, health 
and well-being, crime, conflict and social cohesion – see for example Easterlin (1974), Williams 
(1984), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Ravallion (1997), Barber (2001), Luttmer (2005), Eibner and 
William (2005), Veenstra (2005), Subramanian and Kakawi (2006), Clark et al (2008), Gravelle and 
Sutton (2009), Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), Stiglitz (2013) and Ostry et al (2014). In addition, all 
societies share a basic, intrinsic concern for equity and justice, and high levels of inequality often 
conflict with those notions – as for example when life chances or opportunities differ significantly 
between groups defined by gender, inherited wealth, ethnicity or other accidents of birth (World 
Bank 2005).  
Widespread concern about the adverse impacts of income inequality has generated significant 
interest in the question of what governments can do to reduce inequality. The sorts of government 
policies which can affect income inequality are recognised to be broad, including fiscal policy, trade 
policy, minimum wages, interest rate controls, land reform, anti-discrimination legislation, 
affirmative action, and so on. Nevertheless, choices with regard to the level and composition of 
government spending are clearly one important way of addressing income inequality, and a large 
body of literature has emerged which investigates the effects of government spending on income 
inequality, much of it using cross-country econometrics.  
In this paper we present the findings of a meta-regression analysis exploring the effects of 
government spending on income inequality, with a focus on low and middle income countries.i We 
examine the results from the econometric literature, and identify a total of 84 separate studies 
containing over 900 estimates of the effect of a measure of spending on a measure of income 
inequality. We follow the MAER-Net reporting guidelines (Stanley et al, 2013:393) and adopt the 
following structure. The next section provides a review of the literature summarising the key 
evidence relating to the effects of government spending on income inequality in low and middle 
income countries. Section 3 outlines the search strategy and inclusion criteria; section 4 presents 
and discusses the meta-regression approach as well as findings. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2. Literature Review 
There is much evidence to suggest that at least some types of government spending have tended to 
lower income inequality in many countries and regions of the world (e.g. Goni et al 2011; Lustig 
2011, 2015; Lustig et al 2013; Martinez Vazquez et al 2012). However, it is also recognised that the 
relationship between government spending and inequality is complex, and many doubts have been 
raised about the effectiveness of government spending as a redistributive policy instrument, 
particularly in low and middle income countries.  
For example, it is often argued that government spending on social transfers tends to reduce income 
inequality, but the size of the effect can vary substantially, depending on the extent to which 
transfers are targeted on lower income groups. If most spending on transfers are captured by the 
middle class, for political economy reasons, the impact on inequality may be quite small (Milanovic 
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1994). The same applies to spending on indirect subsidies, which makes up a significant share of 
total government spending in many developing countries, but which often disproportionately 
benefits higher income groups (Rhee et al 2014). It has also been argued that government spending 
on health and education reduces income inequality, by producing a more equal distribution of 
human capital. However, the size of the effect again depends on how well such spending is targeted. 
There is evidence that much of the benefits of government health and education spending in 
developing countries are received by middle-income groups in urban areas (Tanzi 1974, Alesina 
1998, Davoodi et al 2003).  
One key issue in assessing the effects of government spending on income inequality is the distinction 
between ‘first-round’ and ‘second-round’ effects (Chu et al 2000; Bastagli et al 2012, 2015). For 
example, the immediate first-round effect of government transfers to lower income households will 
be to reduce inequality in household disposable (post-fiscal) income, since transfers are included in 
the definition of disposable income. Over time however, transfers can also have second-round 
effects on inequality in household market (pre-fiscal) income, which may either reinforce or offset 
the first-round effects. Government consumption spending, which does not include transfers or 
indirect subsidies, can still have significant second-round effects, although some such spending, for 
example on primary education, may affect income inequality only after a fairly long time lag (ibid). 
The overall effects of government spending may differ therefore, depending on how income is 
measured (post-fiscal or pre-fiscal), and on the time period being considered.  
In addition, both spending and the financing of spending can affect income inequality, and the two 
effects could either reinforce or counteract each other. It is often argued that the redistributive 
effect of taxation in developing countries has been limited, due for example to greater reliance on 
indirect taxes and widespread evasion of direct taxes (e.g. Tanzi 1974, Bird and Zolt 2005, Chu et al 
2000, Goni et al 2011, Mahon 2012, Claus et al 2012). However, there is evidence that higher 
inflation raises income inequality (e.g. Bulif 1998, Easterly and Fischer 1998), which would offset the 
redistributive impact of government spending if the latter is financed via monetary expansion. From 
an empirical point of view therefore, the estimated effects of government spending may differ 
depending on whether we are referring to the ‘overall’ effect of spending, including the way in which 
it is financed, or the ‘pure’ effect, controlling for the way in which it is financed.   
Another important issue is reverse causality. It has been argued that countries with higher levels of 
inequality in market income tend to engage in more redistributive activity (Meltzer and Richard 
1981, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994). The idea is that when market incomes 
are unequal, governments face political pressures to redistribute income. In a democratic system for 
example, a larger share of the population will stand to gain from income taxes and transfers, and a 
political majority emerges in favour of redistribution. Even in a non-democratic system, similar 
processes may operate, e.g. through popular mass protest in support of redistributive political 
movements.ii Thus the direction of causality between government spending and income inequality 
can run in both directions, and unless controlled for in some way, this could result in biased 
estimates of the causal impact of government spending on income inequality.  
Despite widespread interest in the effects of government spending on income inequality, the results 
from the econometric literature appear so far to be inconclusive.iii One widely cited study (Dollar and 
Kraay 2002) using a large cross-country dataset found no evidence of a statistically significant 
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relationship between government spending on health and education and the share of the poorest 20 
percent of households in national income, which is one common measure of income inequality. A 
recent update of this study, by Dollar et al (2013), found similar results. However, other recent 
studies have found evidence that certain types of government spending, for example on social 
welfare, education and health, do have a negative and statistically significant effect on income 
inequality (e.g. Martinez Vazquez et al 2012, Claus et al 2012).  
There does therefore appear to be a role for meta-regression analysis in terms of synthesising these 
apparently conflicting research findings from the econometric literature, and in explaining why 
estimates of the effect of government spending on income inequality do tend to vary. There has to 
our knowledge been only one systematic review of the evidence on the determinants of income 
inequality. This is the study by Abdullah et al (2015), which compares the results of 64 mainly cross-
country econometric studies looking at the effects of education on income inequality.iv Their analysis 
showed that indicators of education do on average have a negative effect on income inequality, and 
that the heterogeneity of results can be explained – via meta-regression analysis – by a combination 
of differences in econometric specification, and differences in measures of inequality and education. 
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3. Search Strategy and Inclusion Criteria  
Search strategyv 
In order to select appropriate databases for this review we followed the Campbell Collaboration 
guide on key online databases for systematic reviews in International Development (Campbell 
Collaboration 2012). This list was complemented with additional databases and websites used by 
other systematic reviews on questions relevant to this review. We also reviewed relevant 
institutional websites of key institutions and conference proceedings (see Online Appendix, Table 
A1.1. for details). Each database was searched using a combination of the search terms indicated in 
Table 1. This shows three sets of concepts (A, B and C), each of them containing a list of associated 
terms or synonyms that were used in our search. When using foreign language databases, each of 
the terms was translated into the appropriate language, i.e., Portuguese or Spanish. Due to the fact 
that some search engines only allow a limited number of operators, two search query strings were 
used: a long version and a short version. The long version follows the equation: 
A + (B W/n C) 
Thus the terms within columns A, B or C in Table 1 were combined with ‘OR’; columns B and C were 
combined with the proximity operator W/n, where n is the number of words that separate the terms 
from the two columns; and column A was combined with the combination of B and C using the AND 
command.vi 
Table 1. Key terms for search strategy 
A B C 
Policy Income Inequality 
Polic* Income* *Equal* 
Intervention* Expenditure* *Distribut* 
Program*  Disparit* 
Instrument*  Differen* 
Tool*  Gap* 
Reform*  *Equit* 
Legislation* 
Govern* 
 
 Share*  
Ratio*  
Gini 
Notes: * is included as a truncation symbol to capture automatically conjugated forms of each word; thus *equal* captures 
“inequality” as well as “inequalities”; *distribut* captures “distribution” as well as “redistribution”.  
In addition to these electronic searches, we carried out some additional searches using hand-
searching. 
Inclusion Criteria 
Our inclusion criteria follow standard procedures commonly used in the systematic review context. 
In terms of types of participants (population), the review is restricted to studies of low income 
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countries (LICs) and middle income countries (MICs) at the time of the government intervention; 
studies which focus only on high income countries are excluded. The World Bank definitions of LICs 
and MICs are used in applying this criterion. Note however that many studies include countries from 
all income groups (low, middle and high) in the analysis; we include such studies, on the grounds 
that they typically contain a significant proportion of low and middle income countries. However, we 
exclude studies which focus predominantly on high income countries.  
The vast majority of studies involve comparisons of inequality across countries and over time, using 
panel data, although there are also some single-county studies using time series analysis. The 
analysis is restricted to studies focusing on income inequality at the national level. We include 
studies that focus on inequality in a comprehensive measure of income that includes income from all 
sources (e.g. wages and salaries, business profits, investment earnings, rental income, transfers). We 
include studies that focus on inequality in market (pre-fiscal) income, disposable (post-fiscal) 
income, or total consumption expenditure; the latter is often considered to be a more reliable 
indicator when data on income are difficult to collect. We require that data on income or 
expenditure be drawn from a representative household survey covering all of the relevant 
population. Inequality may be measured using either a global or partial measure of inequality (e.g. 
the Gini coefficient, or the share of the poorest quintile in national income), measured across 
households or individuals.    
We include studies that use econometric analysis to estimate the effects of government spending on 
income inequality. They involve estimating a regression in which a measure of income inequality is 
the dependent variable and the explanatory variables include a measure of government spending; 
examples include government spending on health, education, or social welfare, as a share of GDP. 
This can be written in general terms as:   
ititkkitit ZXI   10  (1) 
where I is a valid measure of income inequality, X is a measure of government spending, Z is a vector 
of other explanatory variables, and   is the error term, with subscripts i and t indicating country and 
year respectively. Note that one exception occurs in the case of an approach first used by Dollar and 
Kraay (2002), and adopted since then by other researchers (e.g. Dollar et al 2013). This involves a 
regression of the average income of the poorest quintile(s) on the average per capita income of the 
population as a whole, as well as a measure of government spending and other explanatory 
variables. Although the dependent variable in this case is not a valid measure of inequality, the 
coefficients obtained from this type of regression are identical to those obtained from equation (1) 
when the dependent variable is the share of the poorest quintile(s) in national income, which is a 
valid measure of inequality. Studies using this type of approach are therefore included in the review.   
Finally, we include published and unpublished studies, including refereed and non-refereed journal 
articles, working papers, conference proceedings, book chapters, government reports, NGO reports 
and other technical reports. We restrict the review to studies published since 1990. This is mainly on 
the grounds that reliable, cross-country data on income inequality have only been available since the 
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early 1990s, so that any studies before this date would not meet basic requirements in terms of data 
quality. Our review is also restricted to studies published in English, Portuguese, and Spanish. 
4. Meta-regression approach  
We carry out a meta-regression analysis for government spending variables and their effect on 
inequality and follow the MAER-NET guidelines to report our findings (see Stanley et al, 2013:393). 
Our approach also follows Abdullah et al (2015) who examined the impact of education on income 
inequality using a meta-regression approach. Before presenting the meta-regression findings 
however, we first discuss our effect size measure, our initial tests for publication bias, and our 
overall modelling approach.  
Effect sizes 
All regression-based estimates were converted into a comparable measure, the partial correlation 
coefficient which was the best choice given our particular context. The partial correlation measures 
the strength of association between income inequality and government spending, holding all other 
factors constant. It is calculated as follows: 
2
t
r
t df


 
 
where t is the t-statistic of the regression coefficient and df is the degrees of freedom from the t-
statistic (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).vii If the t-statistic was not reported we calculated it by 
dividing the regression coefficient by its standard error. We had a few studies that did not report the 
t-statistic or the standard error but we had the exact p-value and the degrees of freedom. In these 
cases we used the TINV function in Excel which allowed us to calculate the t-statistic using the p-
values as well as the degrees of freedom (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, footnote 45). In some 
cases we did not even have the exact p-value and only the levels of statistical significance were given 
such as * (for 10%), ** (for 5%) and *** (for 1%). Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) argue that in such 
cases the analyst will have to decide whether or not the estimates should be included. We decided 
to include them and followed the simplest approach Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012:31) suggested, 
namely to assume that the p-value is 0.01 if the significance level is given as ***, 0.05 if the 
significance level is given as ** and so on. We then used these p-values as well as the degrees of 
freedom to calculate the t-statistic using the TINV function in Excel again. We excluded any study 
that did not report any of the above statistics and therefore did not enable us to calculate the partial 
correlation coefficient.   
We should note that a number of effect size measures exist in the meta-analytical context such as 
standardised mean differences, odds and risk ratios as well as partial correlation coefficients. We 
narrowed down the list of possible effect size calculations closely looking at the data reported in the 
studies we included in our meta-regression approach. The vast majority of the included studies 
reported regression coefficients, t-statistics and standard errors. Hence, we chose the partial 
correlation coefficient as it can be calculated easily from regression output requiring only limited 
information. It is a unitless measure allowing comparisons within and between studies as well as 
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comparisons involving variables using different scales such as Gini coefficients and income shares 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012; Abdullah et al, 2015). It is often argued that the partial correlation 
coefficient should be converted into Fisher’s z scale as the partial correlation coefficient is truncated 
at -1 and +1 which can cause problems. These problems can be overcome by running the meta-
regression on the Fisher’s z transformations, though Hunter and Schmidt (2004) cast doubts about 
using this transformation. Despite these doubts we used the command corrci in STATA to transform 
our partial correlation coefficients to Fisher’s z scale but this made little difference to our results 
which is not surprising if one follows the arguments set out by Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) and 
Abdullah et al (2015). 
We were able to extract 952 estimates of the partial correlation coefficient, from 84 studies. Of 
these, 331 recorded positive partial correlations between a government spending variable and 
income inequality, with 86 of these being statistically significant at the 10% level or below. 621 of 
the estimates recorded negative partial correlations with 277 of these being statistically significant 
(see Online Appendix Table A2.1 for details). viii 
Publication bias 
Publication bias is a serious issue in particular in the context of systematic reviews as it can introduce 
serious biases in the meta-analytical results. It is argued that studies reporting statistically significant 
findings are more likely to be published in peer-reviewed journals than studies reporting statistically 
insignificant findings. This bias in the literature will then also be reflected in the meta-analysis as 
published studies are more likely to be included in a meta-analysis (Borenstein et al 2009). 
The funnel plot is one of the most common methods to illustrate the presence of publication bias 
(see for example Egger et al 1997). Figure 1 illustrates a funnel plot which plots the effect size on the 
x-axis, here the partial correlation coefficient between measures of government spending and 
income inequality, and precision (or the inverse of the standard error of the partial correlation 
coefficient) on the y axis. At the bottom of the graph we find the estimates with less precision, i.e. 
with the larger standard errors, while the estimates with more precision, i.e. smaller standard errors, 
are more towards the top of the funnel plot. Visual inspection suggests that there is no publication 
bias present when the studies are distributed symmetrically. In this case a first inspection of the 
funnel plot suggests symmetry as both positive and negative estimates are evenly distributed 
around the mean value of the partial correlation coefficient (-0.083), indicated by the solid vertical 
line.   
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Figure 1. Funnel Plot, Partial Correlations of Government Spending and Income Inequality (n=952) 
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Note: Precision is calculated as 1/standard error of the partial correlation coefficient. The weighted mean of 
the partial correlation coefficient is marked with a red line with the value of -0.083 (s.e. = 0.005).  
However, visual inspections of publication bias can be subjective (Borenstein et al, 2009; Abdullah et 
al, 2015) and thus Stanley (2005, 2008) suggests the use of the FAT-PET (Funnel-Asymmetry 
Precision-Effect) regression as an empirical test to check more reliably for any publication bias. We 
carry out this test as part of our meta-regression analysis.  
Note that a visual inspection of Figure 1 indicates the presence of a few outliers, particularly in the 
upper left corner. These estimates were double checked to ensure they had been correctly entered 
and coded. We proceed with presenting the meta-regression results removing the outliers as an in 
depth inspection of the nine outliers from four studies indicated potential errors in the effect sizes 
reported in the respective studies; for example, reported t-statistics were abnormally high. 
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Modelling heterogeneity 
Although our inclusion criteria are designed to identify a set of broadly similar studies, we suspect 
that a certain degree of heterogeneity remains. This view is confirmed by the funnel plot we 
presented in Figure 1, as the reported estimates are rather spread out. To better understand what 
drives this heterogeneity we follow Abdullah et al (2015) and adopt the following meta-regression 
model to explore heterogeneity in the reported estimates: 
1 0r Z SEij k ki ij ij        
where r is the partial correlation coefficient expressing the link between a measure of government 
spending and a measure of income inequality, of the ith estimate from the jth study. Z is a vector of 
variables that capture differences in the relationship between government spending and income 
inequality. SE is the standard error of the partial correlation coefficient and ij is the error term. The 
standard error of the partial correlation coefficient is calculated as follows: ix 
r
SE
t
  
The following variables are included in the Z vector (see Table 2): 
Measures of the dependent variable: Our variable of interest is income inequality. We included any 
study that used a recognized measure of income inequality. While most studies use the Gini 
coefficient, a substantial proportion use measures based on income shares (e.g. the share of the 
poorest 10% or 20% of households in national income, or the ratio of the income share of the richest 
20% of households to that of the poorest 20%).  
Measures of government spending: Government spending was coded into 10 different categories: 
total, health, education, health & education, social welfare, military, housing, social (general), 
consumption and others (see Table 2).x Our meta-regression model aims to test the differential 
impact of these different types of government spending measures on the reported results. 
Country composition: The main geographical areas covered include Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America, South Asia, East Asia & Pacific, Middle East & North Africa and Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia. Although our main focus is on low and middle income countries, over half of the estimates are 
based on samples including data from high income countries. 
Data: Most estimates are based on a non-OLS method, e.g. dynamic panel estimators such as 
generalised method of moments (GMM), more traditional panel data analysis using random and/or 
fixed effects, or other econometric approaches such as instrumental variables, 2 or 3-stage least 
squares, propensity score matching, differences-in-differences or similar. The average year of the 
data used was included to account for different time periods and spans, as the relationship between 
government spending and income inequality may vary over time. The variable was transformed as 
follows: Yr= Year data- average year data (1986). 
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Other explanatory variables: Most studies include a range of explanatory variables in their 
regressions. In our MRA we include variables corresponding to whether any of the following six 
control variables were included: trade policy, tax revenue, inflation, governance, education and 
population. The variables are coded 1 if they are included in the regressions as explanatory variables 
and 0 if otherwise. These specific variables were chosen after careful reviewing all included studies 
and counting the variables that appear more frequently. Three correspond to different ways of 
financing government spending: tax revenue, trade policy, and inflation. The tax revenue category 
includes measures of total, direct and indirect tax revenue, typically measured as a share of GDP. 
The trade policy category incorporates a range of measures of trade policy, including import tariffs, 
export duties, non-tariff barriers and trade policy indices. Inflation includes any measure of changes 
in the price level. The governance category was included to reflect the potential influence of 
democracy and institutional factors on the effectiveness of government spending, as proxied by 
voice and accountability, corruption, and so on. Education variables include years of education and 
schooling-related variables like educational attainment, enrolment rates or human capital. 
Population appeared frequently in the specifications and it was decided to include this variable as 
well. 
Publication: The standard error of the partial correlation coefficient is included to account for 
publication bias. We also account for differences between published and unpublished studies.xi  
More detailed descriptive information for each variable, including their mean values and standard 
deviations, is reported in the Online Appendix in Table A2.2. We should note that we decided to run 
our meta-regression analysis with and without outliers. The results without the outliers are 
presented in the main text for reasons explained above, while the findings with outliers are 
presented in the Online Appendix in Table A3.1. We prefer the findings without outliers as we 
suspect errors in the reported effect sizes among the estimates we visually identified as outliers. We 
typically only observe small differences between the regressions with and without outliers; we 
comment further below on the few cases in which they do differ. We also acknowledge that there 
are meta-analyses that employ Bayesian model averaging techniques (see for example Moeltner and 
Rosenberger, 2008; Iršová and Havránek, 2013). Although this approach has not been adopted in the 
paper, it can be used to deal with model uncertainties and identify the most appropriate set of 
explanatory variables given a particular study context. 
Estimations are carried out using a regression procedure with a weighted least squares (WLS) 
routine that Stanley and Doucouliagos (2013 and forthcoming, 2016) advocate in a recent set of 
papers. They demonstrate how an unrestricted WLS-MRA is likely to be as good as and often better 
than both random-effects and fixed-effect meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis in practical 
applications (using the command metareg in STATA). The majority of the studies we included 
reported more than one result that could be used to calculate the partial correlation coefficient, 
none of the studies specified a preferred result, and thus we were faced with multiple dependent 
estimates per study. This needs to be dealt with appropriately to avoid bias due to data dependency 
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001: 105, 125). The literature suggests a number of approaches to dealing with 
multiples estimates per study (see for example Lipsey and Wilson, 2001; Borenstein et al, 2009:230) 
and there is no consensus on the preferred approach. Thus, in the Online Appendix in Table A4.1, we 
explore different approaches to dealing with multiple dependent estimates per study as robustness 
checks. Following Abdullah et al (2015), our preferred approach to accounting for multiple estimates 
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per study is to use precision squared (inverse variance or 1/standard error squared) as weights with 
study level clustered standard errors. 
Finally, the data used for the meta-regression analysis as well as the corresponding STATA do files 
are available from the authors on request. 
Table 2. Meta-regression variable definitions 
Variable name Variable description 
Inequality measure 
Gini BD=1: Gini coefficient (used as the base) 
Income Share Bottom BD=1: Income share of the bottom decile or quintile(s) 
Income Share Top BD=1: Income share of the top decile or quintile(s) 
Income Share Ratio BD=1: Income share ratios 
Theil index BD=1: Theil index 
Government spending measure 
Total spending BD=1: Total government spending  (used as the base) 
Health spending BD=1: Health government spending  
Education spending BD=1: Education government spending  
Health & Education spending BD=1: Health & Education government spending 
Social welfare spending BD=1: Social welfare spending  
Military spending BD=1: Military government spending  
Housing spending BD=1: Housing government spending  
Social spending (general) BD=1: Social government spending (general)  
Consumption spending  BD=1: Government spending (consumption)  
Other spending  BD=1: Government spending (any/not specified/other)  
Country composition 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) BD=1: Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa included in samples 
Latin America (LAC) BD=1: Countries in Latin America included in samples 
South Asia (SA) BD=1: Countries in South Asia included in samples 
East Asia & Pacific (EAP) BD=1: Countries in East Asia & Pacific included in samples 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) BD=1: Countries in Middle East & North Africa included in 
samples 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 
(EECA) 
BD=1: Countries in Eastern Europe & Central Asia included in 
samples 
Developed BD=1: Developed countries included in samples 
Data 
OLS BD=1: OLS estimator used 
Year data Average year of data used in each study minus average year 
data of the sample 
Other explanatory variables 
Tax BD=1: Tax revenue included as explanatory variable 
Trade BD=1: Trade policy measure included as explanatory variable 
Education BD=1: Education variable included as explanatory variable 
Inflation BD=1: Inflation included as explanatory variable 
Population BD=1: Population included as explanatory variable 
Governance BD=1: Governance variable included as explanatory variable 
Publication 
Standard error Standard error of the partial correlation coefficient  
Unpublished BD=1: Study is unpublished 
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Notes: * BD means binary dummy with a value of 1 if condition if fulfilled and zero otherwise.  
Main meta-regression findings  
We present the main findings of our meta-regression analysis in Table 3, where we seek to establish 
whether there is a relationship between government spending and income inequality, and what 
explains the heterogeneity in this relationship. Regression 1 reports the FAT-PET results where the 
standard error of the partial correlation coefficient is regressed on the partial correlation coefficient. 
Recall that the FAT-PET regression is an empirical check to explore publication bias. The results 
indicate that there is some publication bias as the coefficient for the standard error is statistically 
significant. The amount of publication bias implied by regression 1 is not that large: the average 
relationship between government spending and income inequality, after correcting for publication 
bias, is -0.111 (s.e.= 0.021), which is not substantially different from the average relationship when 
not correcting for publication bias (-0.083, s.e.= 0.005). In addition, the coefficient on the standard 
error term is statistically significant only at the 10% level. We have also run the FAT-PET model with 
study fixed effects (see Online Appendix Table A5.1.). These results broadly confirm the results of 
the basic model in Table 3, although the coefficient is no longer statistically significant when 
including fixed effects and using cluster-robust standard errors. The coefficient for the standard 
error is positive, indicating that the estimated partial correlation coefficients are skewed towards 
positive values; negative effects are being under-reported in the literature. The constant in 
regression 1 quantifies the overall or average relationship between government spending and 
income inequality, after correcting for publication bias. This takes the value of -0.111, which is 
statistically significant at a 1% significance level, implying a statistically significant negative 
relationship between government spending and income inequality.   
In regression 2 additional dummy variables are added representing different income inequality 
measures, to explore whether the relationship differs depending on the income inequality measure 
that has been adopted. The values for income share bottom, income share ratio and Theil index are 
positive and statistically significant at 5%, 10% and 1% in that order.xii A positive effect for a 
moderator variable means that the variable results in a larger positive (or smaller negative) 
relationship between government spending and income inequality. Only the value for income share 
top has a negative and statistically significant effect at 10%. The results in Regression 2 indicate that 
in the case of using the Gini coefficient there is an average relationship of -0.108 (significant at 1%) 
between government spending and income inequality, after correcting for publication bias. On the 
other hand, the relationship is slightly positive when income share ratio (0.057) and Theil index 
(0.233) are used. This, however, is not the case for income share bottom (-0.047 – the estimate is not 
statistically significant).xiii 
Regression 3 is our main model as it includes all potentially relevant explanatory variables described 
above. Of the moderator variables for the control variables (tax, trade, governance, inflation, 
education and population), governance is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. This 
implies that studies which control for governance indicators report a smaller negative (or larger 
positive) relationship between government spending and income inequality, other things being 
equal. The same logic applies to the trade variable which is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level implying that studies controlling for trade policy indicators report smaller negative 
relationships between government spending and income inequality. By contrast, the coefficient for 
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inflation is negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level), indicating that studies that control 
for inflation report a larger negative (or smaller positive) relationship between government spending 
and income inequality. In terms of the variables for sample coverage, the picture is similar as the 
variable for LAC is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that studies including Latin 
American countries in the sample find a larger negative (or smaller positive) relationship. None of 
the other moderator variables for control variables or sample coverage are statistically significant 
however.  
We are particularly interested in the results for the disaggregated measures of government 
spending. We find a positive and statistically significant effect (at 10%) for military spending. 
Similarly, the coefficient for health and education spending is also positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This indicates that studies focusing on health and education spending find on 
average a larger positive (or smaller negative) relationship between spending and inequality than 
studies using total spending. This is perhaps surprising, since health and education are often 
considered to be relatively ‘pro-poor’ components of government spending (Mosley et al. 2004), 
although there is evidence from studies such as Tanzi (1974), Alesina (1998) and Davoodi et al (2003) 
suggesting that much of the benefits of government spending on health and education in developing 
countries are received by middle-income groups in urban areas, which can end up raising inequality. 
Note however that we have only five observations for this particular measure of spending. In 
addition, we do find a negative and statistically significant effect (at the 5% level) for social spending 
(general), which includes social welfare spending as well as health and education spending.  
We are also particularly interested in the results for the OLS variable, which captures the different 
analytical approaches used. The coefficient for this variable is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This implies that studies using OLS as an estimation method report, on average, larger 
negative (or smaller positive) correlations between government spending and income inequality, 
holding all other MRA variables constant.  
In regression 4 we follow Leonard, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2014) and employ a general-to-specific 
modelling strategy, removing the variable that has the largest p-value until all p-values are <0.05. 
The rationale for employing a general-to-specific approach can be found in Stanley and Doucouliagos 
(2012) who argue that they prefer a more specific model as it makes the underlying associations 
clearer. In the specific model (regression 4) we observe that income share bottom, Theil index, trade, 
health and education spending and military spending are statistically significant and positive (except 
other spending which was not significant in regression 3) as already seen in regression 3. In addition 
income share top, LAC and inflation are negative and statistically significant, at 5% for income share 
top and 1% for LAC and inflation as already observed in regression 3 as well.  
Finally in regression 5 we report the estimates from a robust regression which strengthen our 
findings further.xiv We should note that of the 12 variables that are statistically significant at the 10% 
level or below in regression 3, 11 remain significant in regression 5; these are standard error, income 
share bottom, income share top, Theil index, OLS, LAC, governance, inflation, health and education 
spending, military spending and social spending (general). In addition, when we compare the results 
in Table 3 with those in the Online Appendix in Table A3.1. (which includes outliers), we typically 
only observe very small differences. Of the 11 coefficients which are statistically significant in 
regressions (3) and (5) in Table 3, seven retain the same sign and remain statistically significant when 
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including outliers. These are standard error, income share bottom, Theil index, OLS, inflation, health 
& education spending, and social spending (general) (see Appendix 3, Table A3.1.). In addition, six of 
the 11 coefficients retain the same sign and remain statistically significant in at least four out of the 
five different weighting schemes that we consider (see Appendix 4, Table A4.1.), as do 6 out of 8 
when restricting the analysis to observations using the Gini coefficient (see Appendix 6, Table A6.1.; 
the three variables for inequality measures drop out of the model in this case). These are income 
share top, Theil index, inflation, health & education spending, military spending, and social spending 
(general) (Table A4.1.) and LAC, governance, inflation, health & education spending, military 
spending, and social spending (general) (Table A6.1.). 
The only case in which we observe more substantial differences with the results in Table 3 is when 
we include study-level fixed effects. In this case, only 4 of the 11 coefficients retain the same sign 
and remain statistically significant at the 10% level or below; these are income share bottom, Theil 
index, military spending, and social spending (general) (see Table A7.1.). In addition, in contrast to 
Table 3, the coefficients for the regional variables are larger in size and all statistically significant, and 
the coefficient for LAC is now positive rather than negative. We are uncertain as to what may be 
driving these differences with the results in Table 3. As noted above, there is no consensus on the 
ideal approach in meta-regression analysis for dealing with multiple estimates per study. Our main 
approach, following other recent research (e.g. Abdullah et al 2015), has been to use WLS with a 
range of different possible weighting schemes, combined with cluster-robust standard errors. It is 
clear however that the use of study-level fixed effects leads to somewhat different results, which 
casts doubt on the robustness of some (but not all) of the results in Table 3. We believe that this is 
an area for further research. 
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Table 3. MRA of the effects of government spending on income inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FAT PET 
WLS 
WLS WLS 
general 
WLS 
specific 
Robust 
Standard error 0.712* 
(0.370) 
0.570* 
(0.319) 
0.629* 
(0.366) 
 
 
0.975*** 
(0.153) 
Income Share Bottom  
 
0.061** 
(0.031) 
0.097** 
(0.040) 
0.090*** 
(0.033) 
0.122*** 
(0.018) 
Income Share Top  
 
-0.100* 
(0.051) 
-0.067** 
(0.027) 
-0.080** 
(0.038) 
-0.082*** 
(0.027) 
Income Share Ratio  
 
0.165* 
(0.095) 
0.155 
(0.096) 
 
 
0.257*** 
(0.028) 
Theil index  
 
0.341*** 
(0.017) 
0.210*** 
(0.036) 
0.209*** 
(0.034) 
0.275* 
(0.152) 
Developed  
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.034) 
 
 
0.006 
(0.015) 
Unpublished  
 
 
 
0.018 
(0.019) 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
Year data  
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
OLS  
 
 
 
-0.059** 
(0.025) 
 
 
-0.097*** 
(0.014) 
LAC  
 
 
 
-0.104*** 
(0.034) 
-0.083*** 
(0.023) 
-0.155*** 
(0.022) 
SSA  
 
 
 
0.017 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.025) 
SA  
 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.070) 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
EAP  
 
 
 
-0.040 
(0.053) 
 
 
-0.132*** 
(0.028) 
MENA  
 
 
 
0.064 
(0.049) 
 
 
0.208*** 
(0.031) 
EECA  
 
 
 
-0.012 
(0.021) 
 
 
-0.045*** 
(0.017) 
Tax  
 
 
 
0.044 
(0.031) 
 
 
0.069*** 
(0.027) 
Trade  
 
 
 
0.120*** 
(0.041) 
0.214*** 
(0.032) 
0.013 
(0.034) 
Governance  
 
 
 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
 
 
0.051*** 
(0.013) 
Inflation  
 
 
 
-0.081*** 
(0.020) 
-0.075*** 
(0.019) 
-0.103*** 
(0.012) 
Population  
 
 
 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
 
 
-0.070*** 
(0.016) 
Education  
 
 
 
0.009 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.016 
(0.012) 
Health spending  
 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
 
 
-0.016 
(0.035) 
Education spending  
 
 
 
0.008 
(0.032) 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
Health & Education spending  
 
 
 
0.233*** 
(0.036) 
0.180*** 
(0.030) 
0.258*** 
(0.071) 
Social welfare spending  
 
 
 
-0.052 
(0.034) 
 
 
-0.061*** 
(0.021) 
Military spending  
 
 
 
0.093* 
(0.052) 
0.117*** 
(0.039) 
0.105** 
(0.050) 
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Housing spending  
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.029) 
 
 
0.024 
(0.065) 
Social spending (general)  
 
 
 
-0.095** 
(0.044) 
 
 
-0.078* 
(0.046) 
Consumption spending  
 
 
 
-0.019 
(0.025) 
 
 
-0.037** 
(0.016) 
Other spending  
 
 
 
0.036 
(0.032) 
0.089*** 
(0.020) 
0.037 
(0.039) 
Constant -0.111*** 
(0.021) 
-0.108*** 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.049) 
0.024 
(0.024) 
0.033 
(0.028) 
N 943 943 943 943 943 
R2 0.027 0.095 0.274 0.177 0.458 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the partial correlation coefficient. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All regressions use cluster standard errors to adjust for data dependence, i.e. 
multiple estimates per study. Outliers have been removed for all regressions. All columns use weighted least 
squares using inverse variance weights, except for regression 5 that uses robust regression. In regression 4 we 
employed a general-to-specific modelling strategy, removing the variable that had the largest p-value until all 
p-values are <0.05. For definitions of variables see Table 2. Total government spending is used as the base 
category for the government spending variable. GINI is used as a base in the inequality variable. In order to 
test for multicollinearity we use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for both the general (3) and specific 
regressions (4); the mean VIF is 3.65 and 1.06, respectively, which is not a cause for concern. According to 
Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) values of VIF exceeding 10 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity and 
should be investigated. Regression (5) is a robust regression which is unweighted. As a robustness check we re-
run the results in Table 3 using only the Gini coefficient as the measure of income inequality. The results are 
presented in the Online Appendix in Table 6.1. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Robustness checks – what do subgroup analyses tell us? 
To check further the robustness of our findings we conduct a range of subgroup analyses. In Table 4 
we explore how our findings differ by the different categories of government spending, focusing on 
the four measures of government spending where we had sufficient number of observations. For the 
remaining government spending variables most of the variables of interest were omitted due to the 
low number of observations and hence we felt there is not much value in presenting them here. 
Regression 1 shows the results for total spending, Regression 2 the results for education spending, 
Regression 3 the results for social welfare spending, and Regression 4 the results for consumption 
spending, respectively. 
The findings in Table 4 show some interesting differences between the results for different spending 
measures. In regressions 1 and 4 for example, the coefficients for income share bottom are both 
positive and statistically significant at 1%. This indicates that, compared to studies that use the Gini 
coefficient, studies that use these measures find a smaller negative (or larger positive) relationship 
between total spending as well as consumption spending and inequality, ceteris paribus.  
The results for the average year of the data used also differ somewhat between spending measures. 
This variable is included in order to explore whether the relationship between government spending 
and inequality varies with time. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant in regressions 1, 
i.e., when total spending is used. This suggests that, holding all else constant, studies that use more 
recent data find a smaller negative (or larger positive) relationship between total spending and 
income inequality in comparison with  studies using older data. This finding is the opposite for 
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regression 3, i.e. when social welfare spending is used, where the coefficient for average year of the 
data is negative and statistically significant at 1%. 
Particularly interesting are the results for the regional variables. For example, consider the results 
for Latin America (LAC). The negative coefficient for this variable in regression 1 (statistically 
significant at the 10%) suggests that studies including Latin American countries in the sample find a 
larger negative (or smaller positive) relationship between total spending and income inequality. By 
contrast, the positive coefficients for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and East Asia & Pacific (EAP) in the 
same regression indicate that studies including countries from these regions find a less negative (or 
larger positive) relationship between total spending and income inequality. One possible explanation 
for these results is that government spending has a greater effect in reducing income inequality in 
Latin America than in Sub-Saharan Africa or East Asia & Pacific. Note however that the results for 
social welfare spending and consumption spending in regression 3 and 4 show larger negative 
(smaller positive) relationship with income inequality for studies including countries from Sub-
Saharan Africa. The same applies to countries from the East Asia & Pacific region in regression 4. 
As in Table 3, the sub-group analysis in Table 4 suggests that the inclusion of different control 
variables in econometric models influences the partial correlation between government spending 
and income inequality. Studies that control for trade find a smaller negative (or larger positive) 
relationship between total spending and inequality. The education variable is statistically significant 
in regression 2, implying that the inclusion of this control variable in studies of the relationship 
between education government spending and income inequality is particularly appropriate. 
The results in Table 4 also suggest differences in publication bias across the different spending 
measures. For estimates based on total spending: the coefficient on the standard error is positive 
and statistically significant. For education spending and consumption spending by contrast, the 
coefficient on the standard error is not statistically significant. In addition, for social welfare 
spending, the coefficient on the standard error is negative and statistically significant. For this 
measure of spending therefore, we conclude that positive  estimates of the relationship between 
spending and inequality are being under-reported in the literature.  
In Table 5 we conduct a series of other subgroup analyses with the objective to explore additional 
aspects in the data and to check the robustness of our main findings (note also that the Online 
Appendix in Table A4.1. presents further robustness checks). We were particularly interested to 
explore how our findings might differ by region (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia & 
Pacific and Middle East and North Africa) and check whether the inclusion of developed countries in 
the sample makes a difference.  
The results from Table 5 strengthen our previous discussion and results. In regressions 3-8 (i.e. 
studies including developed/developing countries, Latin American, Sub-Saharan African, East Asia 
Pacific and Middle East and North African countries in the sample) two measures of government 
spending are consistently positive and statistically significant (health & education and military) 
indicating that these categories of government spending report smaller negative (or larger positive) 
partial correlations with income inequality. By contrast, in regressions 3 and regressions 5-8 (studies 
including the Latin American, Sub-Saharan African, East Asian and Middle East & North African 
regions in the sample) social welfare spending has a negative and statistically significant value, 
meaning that the relationship with inequality is on average more negative (less positive) for this 
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measure of spending. Social spending (general) is also negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in samples that include Latin American countries. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the relationship between government spending and income inequality varies 
significantly across regions.  
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Table 4. Subgroup analysis for government spending variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total  
spending 
Education  
spending 
Social welfare  
spending 
Consumption 
spending  
Standard error 1.549*** 
(0.334) 
-0.850 
(1.139) 
-1.709* 
(0.826) 
0.631 
(0.687) 
Income Share Bottom 0.363*** 
(0.043) 
0.013 
(0.153) 
-0.064 
(0.052) 
0.114*** 
(0.032) 
Income Share Top 0.050 
(0.077) 
-0.089 
(0.155) 
-0.040 
(0.046) 
0.001 
(0.037) 
Income Share Ratio    0.134* 
(0.073) 
Theil index 0.259*** 
(0.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developed 0.011 
(0.032) 
-0.128*** 
(0.038) 
-0.384*** 
(0.094) 
-0.000 
(0.052) 
Unpublished -0.315*** 
(0.058) 
0.009 
(0.104) 
0.007 
(0.030) 
0.010 
(0.048) 
Year data 0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
OLS 0.008 
(0.030) 
0.014 
(0.052) 
-0.070 
(0.066) 
-0.065 
(0.044) 
LAC -0.136* 
(0.071) 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.088) 
0.156 
(0.098) 
SSA 0.179*** 
(0.054) 
0.171 
(0.111) 
-0.840*** 
(0.081) 
-0.410** 
(0.162) 
SA 0.011 
(0.095) 
-0.174 
(0.224) 
 
 
0.528** 
(0.200) 
EAP 0.168* 
(0.091) 
0.282 
(0.196) 
0.315*** 
(0.071) 
-0.637*** 
(0.168) 
MENA -0.282 
(0.186) 
 
 
0.504*** 
(0.116) 
0.170 
(0.102) 
EECA -0.036 
(0.051) 
 
 
0.096** 
(0.044) 
0.011 
(0.047) 
Tax  -0.086 
(0.074) 
0.072 
(0.062) 
 
Trade 0.265** 
(0.119) 
 
 
0.075 
(0.114) 
-0.020 
(0.063) 
Governance 0.005 
(0.044) 
-0.064 
(0.085) 
0.043 
(0.050) 
0.025 
(0.029) 
Inflation -0.048* 
(0.027) 
0.059 
(0.087) 
-0.036 
(0.032) 
-0.100* 
(0.050) 
Population 0.079 
(0.073) 
0.009 
(0.060) 
0.035 
(0.046) 
-0.011 
(0.060) 
Education 0.045 
(0.033) 
0.050* 
(0.025) 
0.017 
(0.049) 
0.027 
(0.046) 
Constant -0.055 
(0.078) 
-0.092 
(0.189) 
0.186* 
(0.106) 
0.049 
(0.126) 
N 188 123 108 436 
R2 0.710 0.160 0.641 0.426 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the partial correlation coefficient. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All regressions use cluster standard errors to adjust for data dependence, i.e. 
multiple estimates per study. Outliers have been removed for all regressions. All columns use weighted least 
squares using inverse variance weights.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5. Subgroup analysis for selected non-government variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FAT PET 
WLS 
WLS 
general 
Develope
d, yes=1 
Develope
d, 
no=0 
Latin 
America, 
yes=1 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa, 
yes=1 
East Asia 
Pacific, 
yes=1 
Middle 
East 
North 
Africa, 
yes=1 
Standard 
error 
0.712* 
(0.370) 
0.629* 
(0.366) 
1.125*** 
(0.347) 
-0.403 
(0.894) 
1.129*** 
(0.327) 
1.105*** 
(0.376) 
0.774* 
(0.423) 
0.852* 
(0.428) 
Income Share 
Bottom 
 
 
0.097** 
(0.040) 
0.155*** 
(0.044) 
-0.002 
(0.054) 
0.106** 
(0.041) 
0.079** 
(0.036) 
0.116*** 
(0.040) 
0.106** 
(0.042) 
Income Share 
Top 
 
 
-0.067** 
(0.027) 
-0.032 
(0.032) 
-0.114*** 
(0.034) 
-0.055* 
(0.030) 
-0.028 
(0.025) 
-0.044 
(0.029) 
-0.052* 
(0.028) 
Income Share 
Ratio 
 
 
0.155 
(0.096) 
0.174** 
(0.065) 
-0.271*** 
(0.060) 
0.149* 
(0.088) 
0.139* 
(0.081) 
0.151* 
(0.084) 
0.145 
(0.087) 
Theil index  
 
0.210*** 
(0.036) 
0.214*** 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.221*** 
(0.042) 
0.185*** 
(0.036) 
0.221*** 
(0.041) 
0.190*** 
(0.038) 
Developed  
 
0.004 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
0.026 
(0.036) 
0.016 
(0.034) 
0.007 
(0.035) 
0.011 
(0.035) 
Unpublished  
 
0.018 
(0.019) 
0.039 
(0.023) 
0.020 
(0.042) 
0.021 
(0.022) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
0.024 
(0.025) 
Year data  
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
OLS  
 
-0.059** 
(0.025) 
-0.067** 
(0.025) 
-0.026 
(0.045) 
-0.061** 
(0.028) 
-0.097*** 
(0.034) 
-0.077** 
(0.031) 
-0.081*** 
(0.031) 
LAC  
 
-0.104*** 
(0.034) 
-0.331*** 
(0.098) 
-0.151* 
(0.085) 
 
 
-0.156** 
(0.066) 
-0.241*** 
(0.075) 
-0.142 
(0.106) 
SSA  
 
0.017 
(0.033) 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
0.116 
(0.105) 
0.039 
(0.050) 
 
 
0.063 
(0.043) 
0.024 
(0.053) 
SA  
 
-0.008 
(0.070) 
0.196** 
(0.095) 
-0.028 
(0.083) 
0.443*** 
(0.067) 
 
 
0.123 
(0.080) 
0.099 
(0.065) 
EAP  
 
-0.040 
(0.053) 
 
 
0.093 
(0.071) 
-0.536*** 
(0.074) 
 
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.087) 
MENA  
 
0.064 
(0.049) 
0.085 
(0.101) 
-0.018 
(0.058) 
0.045 
(0.057) 
-0.001 
(0.095) 
0.070 
(0.043) 
 
 
EECA  
 
-0.012 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
-0.053 
(0.071) 
0.009 
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.028) 
0.002 
(0.026) 
Tax  
 
0.044 
(0.031) 
0.070 
(0.047) 
-0.014 
(0.036) 
0.052 
(0.032) 
0.091 
(0.054) 
0.085 
(0.052) 
0.086 
(0.053) 
Trade  
 
0.120*** 
(0.041) 
0.011 
(0.060) 
0.103 
(0.106) 
0.099* 
(0.051) 
0.114* 
(0.057) 
0.104* 
(0.059) 
0.128** 
(0.058) 
Governance  
 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.051** 
(0.024) 
0.085** 
(0.041) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
0.039* 
(0.022) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
Inflation  
 
-0.081*** 
(0.020) 
-0.075*** 
(0.021) 
-0.044 
(0.037) 
-0.080*** 
(0.023) 
-0.099*** 
(0.027) 
-0.095*** 
(0.026) 
-0.099*** 
(0.026) 
Population  
 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
-0.061* 
(0.036) 
-0.096* 
(0.053) 
-0.034 
(0.026) 
-0.061* 
(0.035) 
-0.063* 
(0.035) 
-0.059* 
(0.033) 
Education  
 
0.009 
(0.023) 
0.051* 
(0.029) 
-0.035 
(0.041) 
0.005 
(0.025) 
0.025 
(0.029) 
0.022 
(0.029) 
0.020 
(0.030) 
Health  
 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.126*** 
(0.041) 
0.138* 
(0.072) 
-0.025 
(0.031) 
-0.066 
(0.042) 
-0.052 
(0.042) 
-0.055 
(0.042) 
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spending 
Education 
spending 
 
 
0.008 
(0.032) 
-0.038 
(0.035) 
0.043 
(0.056) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.000 
(0.034) 
0.014 
(0.036) 
0.014 
(0.036) 
Health & 
Education 
spending 
 
 
0.233*** 
(0.036) 
 
 
0.268*** 
(0.064) 
0.219*** 
(0.042) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social welfare 
spending 
 
 
-0.052 
(0.034) 
-0.157*** 
(0.049) 
0.096 
(0.076) 
-0.060* 
(0.035) 
-0.117** 
(0.047) 
-0.109** 
(0.048) 
-0.105** 
(0.048) 
Military 
spending 
 
 
0.093* 
(0.052) 
0.074 
(0.053) 
0.171*** 
(0.055) 
0.113* 
(0.057) 
0.136** 
(0.055) 
0.153** 
(0.060) 
0.159*** 
(0.059) 
Housing 
spending 
 
 
0.013 
(0.029) 
-0.074* 
(0.044) 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.031) 
-0.036 
(0.041) 
-0.019 
(0.039) 
-0.024 
(0.041) 
Social 
spending 
(general)  
 
 
-0.095** 
(0.044) 
-0.154 
(0.123) 
-0.019 
(0.074) 
-0.105** 
(0.051) 
0.058 
(0.040) 
-0.130 
(0.140) 
0.049 
(0.045) 
Consumption 
spending  
 
 
-0.019 
(0.025) 
-0.090*** 
(0.032) 
0.027 
(0.046) 
-0.033 
(0.029) 
-0.042 
(0.030) 
-0.048 
(0.031) 
-0.035 
(0.030) 
Other 
spending  
 
 
0.036 
(0.032) 
-0.065 
(0.053) 
0.039 
(0.059) 
0.024 
(0.034) 
-0.022 
(0.053) 
-0.015 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(0.053) 
Constant -0.111*** 
(0.021) 
-0.013 
(0.049) 
-0.166* 
(0.097) 
0.029 
(0.123) 
-0.136*** 
(0.032) 
0.036 
(0.097) 
-0.113 
(0.090) 
-0.090 
(0.085) 
N 943 943 572 371 798 687 738 743 
R2 0.027 0.274 0.392 0.317 0.276 0.333 0.323 0.337 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the partial correlation coefficient. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All regressions use cluster standard errors to adjust for data dependence, i.e. 
multiple estimates per study. Outliers have been removed for all regressions. All columns use weighted least 
squares using inverse variance weights.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Finally, there are some similarities between the regressions presented in Table 3 and some of the 
subgroup analyses presented in Table 5. For example, the coefficient for income share bottom is 
consistently positive and statistically significant, indicating again that studies using this measure tend 
to report a less negative (or more positive) relationship between government spending and income 
inequality. Similarly, OLS is consistently negative and significant across 4 subgroup comparisons 
implying that studies using this estimation method are, on average, reporting a larger negative (or 
smaller positive) relationship between government spending and income inequality. 
Note however that there is a marked difference between the results for the different measures of 
spending, depending on whether developed countries are included in the sample (regressions 3 and 
4). In particular, the positive and statistically coefficient on military spending is observed only for 
samples excluding developed countries, while the negative and statistically coefficient on social 
welfare spending is only observed for samples including developed countries. Furthermore, while 
the coefficient on health spending is negative and statistically significant for samples including 
developed countries, it is positive and statistically significant for samples excluding them. These 
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results suggest that government spending on social sectors (e.g. health, education, social welfare) 
has a greater redistributive impact in developed countries than in developing countries.  
As mentioned above, we also conducted further robustness checks using different approaches to 
addressing multiple dependent estimates per study. Online Appendix Table A4.1. presents the 
results of the different weighting schemes that are often used to deal with biases due to data 
dependence.  
Is there an association between government spending and income inequality? 
The results in Tables 3-5 show that both the size and direction of the estimated relationship 
between government spending and income inequality are affected by a range of factors, including 
the country composition of the sample, the control variables included in the analysis, the analytical 
approach used, and the measure of government spending used. This makes it difficult to answer the 
question of whether or not there is – on average – a strong association between government 
spending and income inequality. However, we are able to make some progress towards this question 
by calculating the average (or predicted) relationship between government spending and income 
inequality implied by the results in Tables 3-5, for a certain set of values of the moderator variables. 
This is done in Table 6.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows the average relationship between the different measures of government 
spending and different measures of inequality predicted by the results in Regression 3 of Table 3; 
Panel B then does the same using the results in Regression 5. In each case, we consider a study that 
is published, uses a more robust non-OLS analytical approach, includes all developing country 
regions but not developed countries in the sample, uses a period of time centred on 1986, and 
includes all six control variables in the analysis (e.g. governance, inflation, education, and so on). At 
least for this set of moderator variables, the average relationship is negative in most cases, 
particularly for the Gini coefficient and the top income share, and when using the Regression 5 
results. In these cases, the negative relationship tends to be largest in magnitude for social welfare 
spending and general social spending, which includes health and education as well as social welfare. 
Not surprisingly perhaps, there is no evidence of a negative relationship in the case of military 
spending. However, the relationship is also statistically insignificant for all measures of government 
spending when using the bottom income share, and is often positive and statistically significant 
when using the ratio of income shares. This suggests that the redistributive impact of government 
spending has not extended to the entire income distribution, but has instead been concentrated 
more towards middle income groups.  
The results in Table 6 refer of course only to one particular set of moderator variables. They are also 
based only on the pooled results in Table 3, and as we have seen there are some differences in 
results by sub-group. Nevertheless, the results do show at least some evidence of a statistically 
significant negative relationship between most categories of government spending and income 
inequality, which appears to be stronger for social spending, and for the Gini coefficient and top 
income share measures of inequality. In terms of the strength of association, it has been suggested 
that a partial correlation coefficient of less than 0.07 in absolute terms can be considered small, with 
0.17 or above considered to be moderate, and 0.33 or above large (Doucouliagos 2011, Abdullah et 
al 2015). This is in line with what Cohen (1988: 115) suggests who argues that for partial correlation 
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coefficients, the effects are considered to be small when r = 0.1, medium when r = 0.3 and large 
when r = 0.5. Judging by these guidelines therefore, the results in Table 6 imply a small to moderate 
negative relationship between government spending and income inequality.   
Table 6. Predicted (average) relationship between government spending and income inequality 
 Measure of inequality 
Measure of spending Gini 
Income share 
bottom 
Income share 
top 
Income share 
ratio 
A.+ 
Total spending -0.014 0.083 -0.080 0.141 
Health spending -0.015 0.082 -0.082 0.139 
Education spending -0.006 0.091 -0.072 0.149 
Social welfare spending -0.066 0.031 -0.132* 0.089 
Military spending 0.080 0.177 0.013 0.234* 
Social spending (general) -0.109 -0.012 -0.175** 0.046 
Consumption spending -0.033 0.064 -0.100 0.121 
Other spending 0.022 0.119 -0.044 0.177 
B.# 
Total spending -0.125** -0.002 -0.207*** 0.132** 
Health spending -0.141** -0.019 -0.223*** 0.115* 
Education spending -0.130** -0.007 -0.212*** 0.127** 
Social welfare spending -0.185*** -0.063 -0.267*** 0.071 
Military spending -0.019 0.103 -0.102 0.237*** 
Social spending (general) -0.203*** -0.081 -0.285*** 0.054 
Consumption spending -0.161*** -0.039 -0.243*** 0.095 
Other spending -0.087 0.035 -0.169*** 0.169*** 
Notes: +Based on regression 3 in Table 3; #based on regression 5 in Table 3. The following values of all 
moderator variables: standard error=0; unpublished=0; yeardata=0; OLS=0; LAC, SSA, SA, EAP, MENA, EECA all 
equal to 1; Tax, Trade, Governance, Inflation, Population, Education all equal to 1. We do not include the 
results for the health and education or housing spending categories, or the Theil index, given the low number 
of observations for these variables. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
5. Conclusion 
The issue of inequality has been a key issue in international development for several decades now. 
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Although there are many ways of addressing inequality, choices with regard to the level and 
composition of government spending are frequently cited as a key area, and a large body of 
literature has emerged which investigates the effects of government spending on income inequality. 
The meta-regression analysis presented in this paper, based on a total of 84 separate studies 
containing over 900 estimates, shows that both size and direction of the relationship between 
government spending and income inequality are affected by a range of factors. The following 
paragraphs summarise our key findings and highlight the implications, both for our understanding of 
the research field and for policy.  
First, we find that the estimated relationship between government spending and income inequality 
depends on the measure of inequality used. In comparison with the Gini coefficient, the relationship 
tends to be stronger (more negative) when focusing on the share of the richest 10% or 20% in 
national income, and weaker (less negative) when focusing on the share of the poorest 20% or 40%. 
This is an important finding for policy, since it suggests that the redistributive impact of government 
spending has not extended to the entire income distribution, but has instead been concentrated in 
the upper half of the distribution, towards middle income groups. This is consistent with the 
argument that the benefits of government spending are often captured by the middle class, for 
political economy reasons (Tanzi 1974, Milanovic 1994, Alesina 1998, Davoodi et al 2003). In terms 
of further research, it would be better if studies use a wider range of inequality measures, rather 
than relying solely on the Gini coefficient, which is much more sensitive to income changes in the 
middle part of the distribution than it is to changes at the top or bottom (Atkinson 1970). 
Second, on the whole we find little evidence that the period of time covered by the samples used for 
estimation, or the inclusion of developed countries, makes a big difference to the results. This is an 
important finding for research, because econometric studies typically use the largest possible time 
period, and include both developed and developing countries, in order to increase sample size; our 
results on the whole provide no indication that this affects the results substantially. The main 
exception occurs when focusing specifically on social welfare spending, where estimates using more 
recent data show a more negative relationship with income inequality. One possible explanation is a 
general tendency for expenditure in this area to become more progressive over time, which could be 
due to better targeting associated with the recent expansion of conditional cash transfer 
programmes (Lindert et al 2006, Bastagli et al 2012). However, social welfare spending still has a 
much weaker (less negative) relationship with income inequality when developed countries are 
excluded from the analysis, suggesting that targeting problems remain significant in many 
developing countries (Coady et al 2004, Goni et al 2011).  
Third, we find some evidence that studies using ordinary least squares (OLS) as an estimation 
method find a larger negative (or smaller positive) relationship between government spending and 
income inequality. This finding is not robust across all specifications, but what evidence there is 
indicates that studies relying on OLS have had a tendency to overestimate the contribution of 
government spending to the reduction of inequality, compared with more robust analytical 
approaches such as panel data methods and instrumental variables (IV) estimation. We did attempt 
a risk of bias assessment of the included studies, employing an adapted version of the risk of bias 
tool developed by Duvendack et al (2011 and 2012).xv According to this tool the studies using OLS as 
an estimation method were classified as medium risk of bias, suggesting that more robust analytical 
approaches such as panel data methods and instrumental variables (IV) estimations would have 
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lowered the risk of bias. We should note, however, that this tool was developed for the purpose of 
micro-econometric studies and thus not entirely appropriate for the cross-country regressions which 
are dominant in this case. Further work is required to develop more convincing approaches to 
assessing the quality of studies included in systematic reviews as well as meta-regressions.   
Fourth, we find some evidence of publication bias. This is another important finding, because unless 
this is corrected for in some way, publication bias can lead to significant errors in attempts to 
summarise empirical knowledge on a given issue (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). In this case 
however, the amount of bias does not appear to be large, and the coefficient on the standard error 
term is not statistically significant in all of our robustness checks. What evidence there is suggests 
that negative estimates of the relationship between government spending and income inequality are 
being under-reported in the literature. It is difficult to say precisely what might be driving the 
publication bias in this case. One possible explanation is that it is due to ‘polishing’ – in other words, 
the tendency for researchers and editors to report and publish results that are statistically significant 
(Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008). Another possible explanation is that researchers themselves are 
reluctant to report negative relationships, perhaps because of ideological persuasion (e.g. a belief in 
limited government involvement in the economy), or because funding institutions are pre-disposed 
towards this view.xvi It is notable however that when we focus specifically on social welfare spending, 
the direction of publication bias is reversed: in this case, positive estimates of the relationship 
appear to be under-reported in the literature. This could be because positive estimates in this case 
conflict more strongly with prior expectations.  
Finally, in terms of the overall association between government spending and income inequality, 
after controlling for publication bias, we find that the answer depends very much on the type of 
spending being considered and the measure of inequality. The results show some evidence of a 
moderate negative relationship between government spending and income inequality, which is 
strongest for social welfare and other social spending, and when using the Gini coefficient or the top 
income share as the measure of inequality. It is important to recognize however that both the size 
and direction of the estimated relationship is affected by a range of factors. This makes it difficult to 
say whether or not there is on average a strong association between any particular type of 
government spending and income inequality. Although we have in this study been able to identify 
some of the factors influencing the size and direction of the relationship, it is clear that there is 
much heterogeneity left to explain. 
We end by highlighting some of the limitations of this study and some potential directions for 
further work. On the one hand, we have shown that most of our main results are robust to a range 
of different robustness checks, including different ways of treating outliers, different possible 
weighting schemes, and different measures of inequality. It is clear however that different ways of 
dealing with multiple estimates per study, including the use of study-level fixed effects, can lead to 
more different results, at least in this case. We argue that this is an important area for further 
research. On the other hand, the analysis in this paper focuses only on the effects of government 
spending, which is only one aspect of fiscal policy. It would be of equal interest to examine the 
relationship between taxation and income inequality, which has been examined in a large number of 
econometric studies but not yet analysed using MRA. This is another potential area for further 
research.  
27 
 
References 
Abdullah, A., Doucouliagos, H. and Manning, E. (2015). Does education reduce income inequality? A 
meta-regression analysis. Journal of Economic Surveys, 29, 301-316. 
Alesina, A. (1998). The political economy of macroeconomic stabilisations and income inequality: 
myths and reality. In Tanzi, V. and Chu, K. (eds), Income Distribution and High-Quality Growth. 
MIT Press, London.   
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996). Income distribution, political instability, and investment, European 
Economic Review, 40, 1203-1228. 
Anderson, E., D’Orey, M.J., Duvendack, M. and Esposito, L. (2015). The impact of government 
policies on income inequality and the translation of growth into income poverty reduction: 
protocol for two systematic reviews. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 7(4), 484-498. 
Atkinson, A. (1970). On the measurement of inequality. Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 244-263.  
Barber J. G. (2001). Relative misery and youth suicide. Australian Journal of Psychiatry, 35, 49-57.  
Bastagli, F., Coady, D. and Gupta, S. (2012). Income inequality and fiscal policy. IMF Staff Discussion 
Note 12/08, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.   
Bastagli, F., Coady, D. and Gupta, S. (2015). Fiscal redistribution in developing countries: overview of 
policy issues and options. In Clements, B., Mooij, R., Gupta, S. and Keen, M. (eds), Inequality 
and Fiscal Policy. International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.   
Benabou, R. (2000). Unequal societies: income distribution and the social contract. American 
Economic Review, 90, 96-129. 
Bird, R. and Zolt, E. (2005). Redistribution via taxation: the limited role of the personal income tax in 
developing countries. UCLA Law Review, 52, 1627-1695.  
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L.V., Higgins J.P.T. and Rothstein, H.R. (2009). Introduction to Meta-Analysis, 
Wiley, Chichester.  
Bulif, A. (1998). Income Inequality: Does inflation matter? IMF Working Paper WP/98/7, January. 
Campbell Collaboration (2012). Systematic Reviews in International Development: Key Online 
Databases. Available at: 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org./artman2/uploads/1/Database_Guide_for_SRs_in_Int
ernational_Development_1.pdf 
Chu, K., Davoodi, H. and Gupta, S. (2000). Income distribution and tax and government spending 
policies in developing countries. IMF Working Paper 00/62, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington D.C.  
Clark, A.E., Frijters, P. and Shields, M.A. (2008). Relative income, happiness, and utility: an 
explanation for the Easterlin paradox and other puzzles. Journal of Economic Literature, 46, 
95–144. 
28 
 
Claus, I., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Vulovic, V. (2012). Government fiscal policies and redistribution in 
Asian countries. ADB Economics Working Paper Series 310, Asian Development Bank, Manila.  
Coady, D., Grosh, M. and Hoddinott, J. (2006). Targeting of Transfers in Developing Countries. World 
Bank, Washington D.C.  
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioural Sciences. 2nd ed. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Davoodi, H., Tiongson, E. and Asawanuchit, S. (2003). How useful are benefit incidence analyses of 
public expenditure and health spending? IMF Working Paper 03/227, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington D.C.  
De Mello, L. and Tiongson, E. (2006). Income inequality and redistributive government spending. 
Public Finance Review, 34(3), 282-305.  
Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2002). Growth is good for the poor. Journal of Economic Growth, 7(3), 195–
225. 
Dollar, D., Kleineberg, T. and Kraay, A. (2013).  Growth is still good for the poor. Policy Research 
Working Paper 6568, World Bank, Washington D.C.  
Doucouliagos, C. (2011). How large is large? Preliminary and relative guidelines for interpreting 
partial correlations in economics. Economic Series 2011_5. Australia: Faculty of Business and 
Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University. 
Doucouliagos, C. and Paldam, M. (2008). Aid effectiveness on growth: a meta-study. European 
Journal of Political Economy, 24, 1-24.  
Doucouliagos, C. and Paldam, M. (2009). The aid effectiveness literature: the sad results of 40 years 
of research. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(3), 433-461.  
Doucouliagos, C. and Paldam, M. (2014). Finally a breakthrough? The recent rise in the size of the 
estimates of aid effectiveness. Economics Working Papers 2014-07, Aarhus University, 
Denmark.  
Duvendack, M., Palmer-Jones, R., Copestake, J. G., Hooper, L., Loke, Y. and Rao, N. (2011). “What is 
the Evidence of the Impact of Microfinance on the Well-being of Poor People?” London: EPPI-
Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Duvendack, M., Hombrados, J., Palmer-Jones, R. and Waddington, H. (2012). Assessing ‘What Works’ 
in International Development: Meta-Analysis for Sophisticated Dummies. Journal of 
Development Effectiveness, 4(3), 456-471. 
Easterlin, R.A. (1974). Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence. In: 
David, R., Reder, R. (Eds.), Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of 
Moses Abramovitz, Academic Press, New York. 
Easterly, W. and S. Fischer (2001). Inflation and the Poor. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33 
(2), 160-178. 
29 
 
Egger, M.D., Smith, G., Schneider, M. and Minder, C. (1997). Bias in meta-analysis detected by a 
simple, graphical test. BMJ, 315, 629–634. 
Eibner, C. E. and William N. E. (2005). Relative Deprivation, Poor Health Habits and Mortality, Journal 
of Human Resources, 40, 591-620. 
Goni, E., Lopez, J.H. and Serven, L. (2011). Fiscal Redistribution and Income Inequality in Latin 
America. World Development, 39(9), 1558–1569. 
Gravelle, H., and Sutton, M. (2009). Income, relative income, and self-reported health in Britain 
1979-2000, Health Economics, 18, 125-145. 
Hunter, J. and Schmidt, F. (2004). Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias in Research 
Findings. Sage Publications, London. 
Iršová, Z. and Havránek, T. (2013). Determinants of Horizontal Spillovers from FDI: Evidence from a 
Large Meta-Analysis. World Development, 42, 1-15. 
Josheski, D. (2011). Infrastructure investment and economic growth: a meta-regression analysis. 
Lambert Academic Publishing.   
Leonard, de Linde M., Stanley, T.D. and Doucouliagos, H. (2014). Does the UK Minimum Wage 
Reduce Employment? A Meta-Regression Analysis. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
52(3), 499-520. 
Lipsey, M. P. and Wilson, D. (2001). Practical Meta-Analysis. Sage Publications. 
Lindert, K., Skoufias, E. and Shapiro, J. (2006). Redistributing Income to the Poor and the Rich: Public 
Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean, SP Discussion Paper No. 0605, The World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
Lustig, N. (2011). Fiscal policy and income redistribution in Latin America: challenging the 
conventional wisdom. Working Paper 2011-227, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. 
Lustig, N. (2015). Inequality and fiscal redistribution in middle income countries: Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa. Working Paper 410, Center for Global 
Development, Washington D.C.  
Lustig, N., Lopez-Calva, L. and Ortiz-Juarez, E. (2013). Declining Inequality in Latin America in the 
2000s: The Cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. World Development, 44, 129–141. 
Luttmer, E. (2005). Neighbours as negatives: Relative earnings and wellbeing. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 120, 963-1002. 
Mahon, J. (2012). Tax incidence and tax reforms in Latin America. Woodrow Wilson Center, Williams 
College, Massachusetts.  
Martinez-Vasquez, J., Vulovic, V. and Moreno-Dodson, B. (2012). The impact of tax and expenditure 
policies on income distribution: evidence from a large panel of countries. Review of Public 
Economics, 200(4), 95-130.   
30 
 
Meltzer, A. and Richard, S. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Public Choice, 41, 
403-418.  
Milanovic, B. (2000). Do more unequal societies redistribute more? Does the median voter 
hypothesis hold? European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 367-410. 
Moeltner, K. and Rosenberger, R.S. (2008). Predicting Resource Policy Outcomes via Meta-
Regression: Data Space, Model Space, and the Quest for ‘Optimal Scope’. The B.E. Journal of 
Economic Analysis & Policy, 8(1), 1935-1682. 
Mosley, P., Hudson, J. and Verschoor, A. (2004). Aid, poverty reduction and the ‘new conditionality’. 
Economic Journal, 113, F217-F243.  
Ostry, J.D., Berg, A. and Tsangarides, C. G. (2014). Redistribution, Inequality and Growth. IMF Staff 
Discussion note. SDN/14/02. 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1994). Is inequality harmful to growth? Theory and evidence. American 
Economic Review, 84, 600-621.  
Ravallion, M. (1997). Can high-inequality developing countries escape absolute poverty? Economics 
Letters, 56, 51-57. 
Rhee, C., Zhuang, J., Kanbur, R. and Felipe, J. (2014). Confronting Asia’s rising inequality: policy 
options. In Kanbur, R., Rhee, C. and Zhuang, J. (eds), Inequality in Asia and the Pacific: Trends, 
Drivers and Policy Implications. Routledge: London.  
Stanley, T.D. (2005). Beyond publication selection. Journal of Economic Surveys, 19, 309–345. 
Stanley, T.D. (2008). Meta-regression methods for detecting and estimating empirical effects in the 
presence of publication bias. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 70, 103–127. 
Stanley, T.D. and Doucouliagos, H. (2012). Meta-regression Analysis in Economics and Business, 
Routledge, Abingdon. 
Stanley, T.D., Doucouliagos, H., Giles, M., Heckemeyer, J.H., Johnston, R.J., Laroche, P., Pugh, G., 
Nelson, J., Paldam, M., Poot, J., Rosenberger, R. and Rost, K. (2013). Meta-analysis of 
economics research reporting guidelines. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27(2), 390–394. 
Stanley, T.D. and Doucouliagos, H. (2013). Better than Random: Weighted Least Squares Meta-
Regression Analysis. Deakin University, Economics Working Paper Series SWP 2013/2, July.  
Available at: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/workingpapers/papers/2013_2.pdf 
Stanley, T.D. and Doucouliagos, H. (forthcoming, 2016). Neither Fixed nor Random: Weighted Least 
Squares Meta-Regression Analysis. Research Synthesis Methods, forthcoming 2016. 
Stiglitz, J. (2013). The Price of Inequality. Penguin.  
Subramanian, S. V. and I. Kawaki (2006). Being well and doing well: on the importance of income for 
health. International Journal of Social Welfare, 15, (Suppl. 1), S13-S22. 
31 
 
Tanzi, V. (1974). Redistributing income through the budget in Latin America. Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, 27(108), 65-87.  
Veenstra, G. (2005). Social status and health: absolute deprivation or relative comparison, or both? 
Health Sociologic Review, 14, 121-134. 
Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009). The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do 
Better. Allen Lane. 
Williams, K. R. (1984). Economic Sources of Homicide: Reestimating the effects of Poverty and 
Inequality. American Sociologic Review, 49, 283-289. 
World Bank (2005). World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development. Oxford University 
Press. 
32 
 
Notes 
                                                          
i This paper is part of a wider systematic review entitled “What policies and interventions have been strongly 
associated with changes in in-country income inequality?” funded by DFID. A summary of the protocol for this 
review is provided by Anderson et al (2015); the full protocol is available here: 
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/SystematicReviews/Income_inequality_2014_Anderson_protocol.pdf. The 
final report is forthcoming.  
ii Some evidence in support of this argument has been found by Milanovic (2000) and Ostry et al (2014), 
although it has been challenged by other authors (e.g. Perotti 1996, Benabou 2000, de Mello and Tiongson 
2006), who argue that governments in countries where inequality is high tend to redistribute less, because 
political power is firmly in control of higher income groups, who are able to resist any redistributive measures. 
iii Note that evidence on the effects of government spending on income inequality is not restricted to 
econometric evidence; a large body of evidence also comes from fiscal incidence analysis (e.g. Goni et al 2011; 
Lustig 2011, 2015). In this paper however we are concerned only with synthesising results from the 
econometric literature.   
iv There have, by contrast, been a number of systematic reviews of the evidence on the determinants of 
economic growth, including Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009, 2014) on the effects of foreign aid, and 
Josheski (2011) on the effects of infrastructure investment.  
v We should note that the search strategy outlined in this section was developed for the wider systematic 
review that was commissioned and funded by DFID (see footnote 2), which looked at all types of government 
policies and their link to income inequality. The focus was therefore on a broader range of policy interventions, 
not just government spending.  
vi Our strategy is to use n=1 to capture concepts such as ‘distribution of income’, ‘inequality of income’, as well 
as ‘income distribution’ and ‘income inequality’.   
vii The t-statistic was multiplied by -1 when the dependent variable referred to the income share of the poorest 
decile or quintile(s) or the average income of the poorest decile or quintile(s). This is because a rise in these 
variables corresponds to a fall in income inequality. 
viii Note that when we refer to a “study” this could include two separate papers, e.g. an initial working paper 
followed by a published journal article, if the two papers clearly form part of the same research study. In such 
cases, we only include estimates from the earlier working paper if they differ from those contained in the 
published article.    
ix Note that the standard error of the partial correlation coefficient is different from the standard error of the 
individual regression coefficients. 
x Social welfare spending includes components such as pensions, social security, social protection, and other 
welfare spending. The social spending (general) category includes spending on education, health, housing and 
social welfare. Total government spending is used if the study refers to “total government spending”, or just 
“government spending”. Government consumption is used if the study refers specifically to government 
“consumption” expenditure. If the study refers to categories of government spending not covered by the other 
codes, (e.g. government investment spending or wage bill) it was coded under government spending others. 
xi Note that for some studies we include estimates from an unpublished working paper as well as from a 
published journal article (see note viii above). In such cases, the former are coded as unpublished while the 
latter are coded as published, even though they are from the same study.  
xii Note however that the results for the Theil index should be treated with caution, since we have only one 
estimate using this measure of inequality.  
xiii This value was calculated by adding the coefficient on income share other to the constant, i.e. -0.108 +0.165.  
xiv Robust regressions are an alternative to least squares with the purpose to minimise the influence of any 
potential outliers. In other words, robust regressions can be considered to be a robustness check used to 
detect or minimise suspected outliers. 
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xv As outlined in the protocol of the DFID funded systematic review of which this paper is a part; see Anderson 
et al (2015) for details. 
xvi This is in fact the explanation favoured by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009) to explain the evidence of 
publication bias in the aid effectiveness literature. They argue that the research community is reluctant to 
publish negative estimates of this relationship, partly because of researchers desire to be seen as supporting 
the ‘do-good’ activity of foreign aid, and partly because research is often funded by aid organisations.  
